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line, someone replaced the pebbles with
beads and the grooves with rods, mak
ing the abacus much more efficient.
In the west, the line abacus appeared
first in France about the beginning of
the thirteenth century. It was widely
used from the fourteenth to the
seventeenth century but the line abacus
failed to develop into the efficient rod
abacus, and consequently gave way to
the more efficient cipher system.
Two basic forms of the abacus exist
today. The Chinese abacus retains the
form it had in the fifteenth century, with
each rod of beads separated into two
segments by a piece of wood called a
bar. Above the bar, there are two beads
on the rod, and below the bar the rod
contains four beads. Each bead on the
rod above the bar represents five times
the value of each bead on the same rod
below the bar, and each bead is ten times
the value of the bead on the rod to the
immediate right of it.
The Japanese abacus is exactly the
same as the Chinese abacus except for
the fact that only one bead is placed
above the bar. The abacus is still widely
used and contemporary Chinese and
Japanese are proud of their ancient
abacus and its ability to frequently sur
pass the efficiency of modern computing
devices.

International
Accounting
The Case of the
Uncontrolled Foreign
Subsidiary

Editor:
Ula K. Motekat, CPA, DBA
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

Michael H. Morris
University of Cincinnati

REFERENCES
Crook, Welton J. Abacus Arithmetic.
Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1958.
Dilson, Jesse. The Abacus: A Pocket
Computer. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1968.
Kojima, Takashi. Advanced Abacus.
Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company,
Inc., 1967.
The Japan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry. Soroban. Rutland: Charles E.
Tuttle Company, Inc., 1967.
24/ The Woman CPA

In the world of accounting textbooks
the controlling interest and the minority
interest are well defined. The controlling
interest is held by the parent company,
consists of a majority of the outstanding
voting stock of the subsidiary, and con
fers on the parent company the power to
control the activities of the subsidiary.
The minority interest is held by non
related parties, consists of less than fifty
percent of the outstanding voting stock
of the subsidiary, and confers on the
outsiders next to no power over the ac
tivities of the company.
In the world of multi-national groups
the controlling interest and the minority
interest may not be so well defined. An
increasing number of countries, es
pecially less developed countries, have
passed or are passing laws prohibiting
foreigners, including foreign cor
porations, from owning a majority of
the stock of all corporations or of cor

porations in certain industries. India1
and Argentina,2 for instance, allow
foreign equity participation up to forty
percent; Mexico,3 Venezuela,4 and
Iran5 generally limit foreign in
vestments to forty-nine percent.
Since less developed countries usually
suffer from a shortage of investment
capital, the majority stockholders fre
quently are financial institutions of the
host country or agencies of the host
country government. For the multi
national group this outside majority in
terest company is the minority interest;
in practice it has most of the rights and
duties of a parent company. For the
American accountant this situation
raises the question of how to account for
the minority-owned subsidiary: use the
cost method, use the equity method, or
consolidate?
Minority-Owned Subsidiaries
The Accounting Principles Board

(APB) has neatly divided corporate
ownership of common stock into three
groups:
1. The investor company owns less
than twenty percent of the outstanding
voting stock of the investee company, is
presumed not to exercise significant in
fluence over the affairs of the investee
company, and will use the cost method
to account for its investment.
2. The investor company owns twenty
to fifty percent of the outstanding voting
stock of the investee company, is
presumed to exercise significant in
fluence over, but not to control, the af
fairs of the investee company, and will
use the equity method to account for its
investment.
3. The investor company owns more
than fifty percent of the outstanding
voting stock of the investee company, is
presumed to control the affairs of the in
vestee company, will use the equity
method to account for its investment,
and will prepare consolidated financial
statements except in extraordinary
cases, such as pending bankruptcy or
foreign take-over.
The division into these three groups
has been made on the basis of two
different arguments advanced by two
official pronouncements.
APB Opinion No. 18 advocates the
use of the equity method if the investor
company has “the ability to exercise
significant influence over operating and
financial policies of an investee.”1
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Operating policies must be interpreted
to mean the ways in which income is
earned; financial policies must be inter
preted to mean the ways in which funds
are raised and used, including the use of
funds in dividend distributions. In other
words, the equity method is ap
proporiate if the investor company in
fluences the earning and distribution of
income.
ARB No. 51 states that consolidated
statements are “usually necessary for a
fair presentation when one of the com
panies in the group directly or indirectly
has a controlling financial interest in the
other companies.”7 In the next
paragraph “controlling financial in
terest” is defined on a legal basis to mean
a majority voting interest.8 Since a ma
jority voting interest generally means
majority representation on the board of
directors, the parent company is
presumed to control both the earning
and distribution of income.
The enumeration of these criteria for
selecting the appropriate method of ac
counting for a stock investment points

out the fact that the multi-national cor
poration faces a unique problem. Its
minority-owned subsidiary meets some
of the criteria of all three groups, but it
does not meet all of the criteria of any
one of them.
The cost method may be appropriate
because dividend distributions which
generally require a majority vote of the
shareholders or directors may be under
the sole discretation of the majority in
terest, i.e., the host country nationals,
who may make dividend decisions for
political reasons if they are controlled
by or represent an agency of the host
country government. In one year, for in
stance, large dividend distributions may
be desirable to finance other govern
ment activities or to reduce a govern
ment deficit; in another year small or no
dividend distributions may be desirable
to spur internal investment and increase
employment or to show a favorable
balance of trade. Under these cir
cumstances it may be misleading to in
clude the investor’s share of investee ear
nings in its net income or in con
solidated net income.
It can also be argued that under APB
Opinion No. 18 the equity, rather than
the cost, method is appropriate because
the investor company in fact determines
the operating policies of the investee and
usually controls, or at least exercises
significant influence over, some of the
financial policies, such as the borrowing
of funds and the investment in assets.
An argument can also be made that
the operations of the minority-owned
subsidiary are so well integrated with
the operations of other related com
panies that fair presentation under ARB
No. 51 requires the preparation of con
solidated statements. However, if the
legal argument of ARB No. 51 is used,
then such an investee is not actually a
subsidiary and therefore cannot be con
solidated with other legally controlled
subsidiaries.
From the preceding discussion it is
evident that the multi-national group in
these situations controls all the opera
tion and most of the financial policies of
the foreign corporation. The one finan
cial policy over which it has no control
and over which it may not even exercise
any influence is the distribution of
dividends. The solution to this dilemma
then hinges, aside from the legal argu
ment of ARB No. 51, on the poser to
determine the distribution of profits in
the form of dividends.
As every accountant knows, earnings
can be distributed in forms other than

dividends, such as transfer prices and
the allocation of general expenses. In
fact, these rather obvious ways of dis
tributing profits among related com
panies have several important advan
tages over dividends. For one thing,
profits hidden in transfer prices escape
the double taxation of dividends. For
another thing, such profits may be
transferred to countries with lower tax
rates. Of more concern to a multi
national group with stock investments
in less developed countries are probably
the foreign exchange laws. Quite often
the restrictions on obtaining hard
currency are more stringent for the
repatriation of profits than for the pay
ment of bills for goods and services. And
of particular interest to the American
parent with a minority-owned sub
sidiary is the fact that it gets a major
share of the profit in such hidden dis
tributions, but only a minor share of the
dividend distributions. Since the
American parent company is generally
more sophisticated in accounting
matters than the host country, it should
have little difficulty in hiding profit dis
tributions in other transactions.
Evidence of such activities is, of course,
difficult to obtain. However, a Cana
dian researcher found that in Tanzania
nineteen out of twenty-three companies
either managed or partially owned by
multi-nationals were practicing some
form of price management.9
Given the fact that the multi-national
group controls all the operating and
most of the financial policies, including
some forms of profit distribution, of the
minority-owned subsidiary, the
American accountant is justified in
treating this kind of investee like a con
trolled subsidiary and in resolving the
question of how to account for it in
favor of consolidation.
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